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I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This case is on appeal from a final judgment and a
final order of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
County (the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki).

Fairview Care Cen-

ters, Inc., the defendant-appellant, appealed to this Court,
which transferred the appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, which
had original jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann, § 78-22(j).

The Utah Supreme Court, pursuant to Rule 42 of the Utah

Rules of Appellate Procedure, "poured" this appeal "over" to
this Court.

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j).
II.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether Fairview failed to marshal the evidence

in support of the District Court's factual findings and, if so,
whether Fairview is prohibited from attacking the validity of
the District Court's Findings of Fact.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The Court should review Fairview1s Brief, determine
whether Fairview has failed to marshal the evidence in support
of the District Court's Findings of Fact, and, if it so determines, rule that Fairview is prohibited from attacking those
Findings.

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991).
2.

Whether the District Court's Findings of Fact

1

were not clearly erroneous.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
If this Court determines to review the District Court
findings of factf despite Fairviewfs failure to marshal the
evidence, those findings should not be set aside unless they
are clearly erroneous.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

A finding is

considered clearly erroneous only if it is against the clear
weight of the evidence presented or if the appellate court is
convinced that a mistake has been made.

Western Kane County

Special Serv. Dist, No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376,
1377 (Utah 1987).
3.

Whether the District Court correctly ruled that

Fairview's termination of Ms. Rackleyfs employment implicated a
clear and substantial public policy.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review with
respect to this issue appears to be de novo

(as purely a

question of law). "[A]ppellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
Correctness.'"

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994);

"correctness" means "the appellate court decides the matter for
itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of the law."

IJL_; State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431,
2

433 (Utah 1993).
4.

Whether the District Court correctly ruled that

Ms. Rackleyfs conduct in advancing Muriel Mellen!s rights
constituted conduct furthering clear and substantial public
policy.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The applicable standard of appellate review with
respect to this issue appears to be de novo

(as purely a

question of law). "[A]ppellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
'correctness.'"
5.

State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).

Whether Fairview is judicially estopped from

taking positions on appeal that are directly contrary to those
taken during the District Court proceedings.
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Since the District Court was not presented with this
issue, this Court should simply review Fairview1s positions
taken during the trial proceedings and the positions taken on
appeal and determine, as a matter of law, whether Fairview is
estopped from taking a contrary position on appeal.

3

III.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action for unlawful termination of employ-

ment, in violation of the public policy of the State of Utah,
visited upon plaintiff-appellee, Cathleen Rackley, by
defendant-appellant, Fairview Care Centers, Inc. (hereinafter
"Fairview").

Ms. Rackley was fired from her job as the Admin-

istrator of one of the two Salt Lake City nursing homes owned
and operated by Fairview because of her insistence that
Fairview abide by legal and equitable principles dealing with
the rights of the infirm and elderly residents of Fairviewfs
west side facility, as well as the rights of her co-employees.
Ms. Rackley was fired because she informed a Fairview resident,
against Fairview1s wishes, that money belonging to that resident had arrived at Fairview, and because she took action
geared toward allowing that resident to exercise control over
that residentfs own money.

That resident was under no conser-

vatorship or guardianship.
This case was tried before Judge Iwasaki on October
29, 30 and November 1, 8, and 15, 1996.

R. at 342-48.

The

District Court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law in Plaintiff's favor on December 27, 1996.
4

R. at 354-60 (a

copy is attached hereto at pages 1-7 of the Addendum).
B.

OVERVIEW OF FACTS
Ms. Rackley worked as the administrator/manager of

one of Fairview's nursing homes for four months (November 1,
1993 to February 28, 1994).

Tr. Vol. 2 at 402, 587-89.1 Ms.

Rackley had worked in other nursing home facilities and had
experience with clients of varying levels of mental functioning.

Ms. Rackley testified that she understood the importance

of always notifying residents when they received money, regardless of their level of functioning.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 396-97.

Throughout her employment as administrator of
Fairview's west side facility, Ms. Rackley established herself
as a conscientious employee who instituted many positive
changes in the facility.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 124; Vol. 3 at 757-59.

Ms. Rackley was described by Sallie Maroney, the administrator
for Fairview's east side facility as "exceptionally bright and
energetic and very, very knowledgeable."

Tr. Vol. 1 at 212.

On a number of occasions during her employment, Ms.
Rackley took actions that were geared toward honoring and
upholding the law and refraining from violating the require-

1

The transcripts of the trial were not "Bates-stamped"
by the District Court for the appeal. When citing to these
transcripts, the volume number and page number of the transcript will be identified.

5

ments of her licensure as a nursing home administrator and
toward protecting the legal rights of Fairviewfs employees (Tr.
Vol. 3 at 740) and the residents of Fairview!s nursing home
facility.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 540. Ms. Rackley implemented changes

with regard to paying employees according to the law -- meaning
that, if pay day fell on a weekend or holiday, employees would
be paid the first prior working day.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 214-17.

This procedure had not been followed at Fairview because of
supposed "cash flow" problems.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 218-19.

Ms. Rackley also implemented changes in informing
employees that they were entitled to Hepatitis B vaccinations
at Fairview!s expense.
Tr. Vol. 1 at 220-21.

This was in accordance with the law.
Fairview had not told employees about

the vaccinations because the company was in "financial scraps."
Tr. Vol. 1 at 42-43, 220-21.
Another employee, Sallie Maroney (administrator of
east side facility), testified that she was under a lot of
pressure when Ms. Rackley began working at Fairview and that
Ms. Rackley suggested schedule changes that were implemented
and had a positive impact on Ms. Maroneyfs job satisfaction.
Tr. Vol. 1 at 212. Ms. Rackley also implemented changes in
food service to residents (Tr. Vol. 2 at 481-82), in laundry
service (Tr. Vol. 2 at 480-81) and schedule changes for other

6

employees (Tr. Vol. 2 at 485). Other employees described
improvements in efficiency, cleanliness and the overall operation of the Fairview west facility.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 38-41.

Fairviewfs management was not enthusiastic about the
actions taken by Ms. Rackley to uphold the law and honor the
rights of residents and employees.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 628. Ms.

Rackley met with resistance on a number of occasions.

Tr. Vol.

2 at 450, 453, 459, 463, 482, 485. Ms. Rackley testified that
she had began to feel intimidated by Joseph Petersen, the
Fairview boss.

Tr. Vol. 2 at 522.

All witnesses who were questioned on the subject
agreed that a resident has an absolute right to control her own
money.

Karleen Merkley, office manager and assistant C.E.O. of

Fairview had responsibility for financial decisions within
Fairview during the time Ms. Rackley was employed.

Ms. Merkley

testified at trial:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

(Counsel for Ms. Rackley) . . . When you say you make
the financial decisions when Mr. Pete [Mr. Petersen]
isn't around, does that refer to financial decisions
involving residents1 money as well as other things?
(Ms. Merkley) I don't make any decisions with resi
dents1 money.
Okay. Who makes those decisions?
The residents.
That's the way it's supposed to be, isn't it?
Yes.
That's the way it's always supposed to be there—
Yes.
•—is that right? Are you aware of any situations
where that has not been the case?

A.
Q.

No.
As far as you know, every time a decision's made
about residentfs money, the resident has made that
decision herself or himself; correct?

A.

Yes.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 86.
Despite these statements by Ms. Merkley, Ms. Rackley
had been told by other Fairview employees not to get involved
with residents1 finances.

Sallie Maroney testified that she

had never told Ms. Rackley "not to concern herself about what
was going on with residents' personal monies."
221.

Tr. Vol. 1 at

However, when counsel for Ms. Rackley confronted Ms.

Maroney with her deposition testimony and then elicited Ms.
Maroney's opinion regarding an administrator's responsibility
to her or his residents:
(Ms. Rackleyfs counsel reading from Ms. Maroney's
deposition)
"QUESTION: Did you ever tell Cathleen not to worry
about what was going on with residents' personal
monies?
ANSWER: Yes. Probably."
(Ms. Rackley's counsel) Did I read that correctly?
A.
(Sallie Maroney) Yes.
Q.
Cathleen was the administrator, licensed administrator of the facility; correct?
A.
Right.
Q.
You, too, were a licensed administrator for a number
of years; correct?
A.
Right.
Q.
Isn't it the administrator—within the administrator's licensure and—and—and other responsibility to
concern herselves [sic] with things having to do with
residents' rights?
A.
Yes.

8

Q.
A.

And—and doesn't knowledge about funds have something
to do with residents1 rights, ma'am? Yes or no.
Yes.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 221-22 (emphasis added).

Staff at Fairview

understood that residents should make decisions about their own
money, but in practice, these rights were disregarded.
In the latter part of February, 1994, Ms. Rackley
became aware of funds that had arrived for a resident, Muriel
Mellen.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 570-71.

A $720.00 check had arrived

from the Veterans Administration.

Fairview acknowledges in its

Brief that management at Fairview had instructed the staff not
to notify Muriel Mellen of the check.

(Aplt. Brief at 4). In

fact, the entire staff at Fairview conspired to keep from
Muriel Mellen the fact that her $720.00 check had arrived at
the facility.

The reason became apparent during the direct

examination of Sallie Maroney:
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

(Counsel for Ms. Rackley) And did--did Karleen
Merkley tell you that Sharon Mellen doesn't want
Muriel Mellen to know that the money had arrived?
(Sallie Maroney) Yes.
And was the reason for that that $720 was enough to
move out of the Fairview facility?
And live on her own.
Is that correct?
Yes.
And Sharon's request not to tell Muriel about the
money seemed reasonable to you. Yes or no.
Yes.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 230 (emphasis added).

9

Sharon Mellen (Muriel Mellenfs daughter-in-law), with
the complicity of Fairviewfs administration, was keeping the
payment from coming to the attention of Muriel Mellen.

Tr.

Vol. 3 at 576.
Ms. Rackley was aware that Fairviewfs administration
and staff were purposefully keeping this information from
Muriel, so she told Muriel about the check.
576.2

Muriel was extremely upset.

Tr. Vol. 3 at

Tr. Vol. 3 at 575. At

Muriel's request, Ms. Rackley contacted Sharon Mellen.

Tr.

Vol. 3 at 574-75.
Ms. Rackley testified that she simply told Sharon
Mellen that she was concerned about Muriel and that she did not
accuse Sharon Mellen of improper conduct and did not raise her
voice.

Sharon Mellen was very angry that Muriel had been told

about the money because "she was promised that nobody would
find out about the money, that Karleen had talked to her and
nobody should find out about it."

Tr. Vol. 3 at 57 6.

Fairview repeatedly states that Sharon Mellen had
legal authorization to "handle Muriel's money."
4.

The document Muriel Mellen signed stated:

Aplt. Brief at
"TO WHOM IT MAY

CONCERN, I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT SHARON MELLEN [words FAIRVIEW
2

Ms. Rackley had, as previously discussed, brought a
number of problems at the facility to management's attention,
and had encountered resistance to change at almost every turn.
10

CARE CENTER crossed out] HAS AUTHORIZATION TO ASSIST ME IN
MANAGING MY PERSONAL NEEDS ALLOWANCE FUNDS."

Def. Ex. 12 (a

true and correct copy attached hereto at page 21 of the Addendum) . This form is not a power of attorney.

The language

allows for Sharon Mellen to "assist" Muriel Mellen in handling
certain funds.

The term "assist" means to "aid" or "help," not

to take complete responsibility for and not to keep the resident in the dark.

The plain language of the document allows

for Sharon Mellen to help, at Muriel Mellen!s direction, Muriel
Mellen manage Muriel Mellen1s funds.

If Muriel Mellen is not

informed that she has received funds, she is unable to direct
Sharon Mellen as to how those funds should be used.

It is a

curious interpretation indeed that Fairview advances - that
Muriel's signing of the management assistance document is
tantamount to empowering Sharon, and Fairview, to keep her in
the dark about the existence of the funds.3
At a meeting held on February 28, 1994, Mr. Petersen,
acting for Fairview, fired Ms. Rackley.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 592.

During the meeting, and after she had been fired, Ms. Rackley
informed Mr. Petersen, in essence, that Fairview would have

3

Fairview notes that Sharon Mellen was authorized to
sign on Muriel Mellen's bank account. Aplt. Brief at 4 n.2.
This fact has no bearing on Muriel Mellenfs right to know about
money she received.
11

problems down the road because of the firing.
593.

Tr. Vol. 3 at

Fairview then, through Mr. Petersen, offered to rehire

Ms. Rackley, on the condition that she discuss resident finances with Fairviewfs Ms. Merkley or Ms. Maroney before
talking with resident families about such matters.
at 597-98.

Tr. Vol. 3

Ms. Rackley rejected the offer because she knew

that that would, based on the Muriel Mellen incident, jeopardize residents1 rights, and that she would not be able to
uphold the legal obligations placed on her or be able to
execute her job duties, especially in the area of resident
rights.

Tr. Vol. 3 at 597-99.
Other employees at Fairview testified that they had

contacted resident family members by phone before and had never
been reprimanded or warned not to do so.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 56.

After Ms. Rackley was terminated, she notified Ana
Lird, of the Salt Lake County Aging Services, of the events
surrounding the Muriel Mellen incident.

Ms. Lird sent two

letters, one dated June 16, 1994, and one dated December 5,
1994 to the Fairview west facility regarding the Mellen incident.

PI. Ex. No. 14 & 15 (copies attached as Exhibit "B" of

Addendum to Aplt. Brief).

Both letters were accompanied by a

document entitled "Long Term Care Ombudsman Finding and Recommendation."

The first one concluded that Ms. Rackley!s com-

12

plaint of Fairview's misconduct had been "verified," and the
second one concluded that the complaint had been "semi-verified."

Id.

Both reports also include the language that "any

discriminatory action or retaliation taken against any person
who provided information regarding the complaint constitutes a
Class B misdemeanor."
The District Court found that Ms. Rackley was terminated by Fairview and that her termination was in violation of
clear and substantial public policy.4
IV.
1«

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Fairview!s Brief fails in a number of respects.

First, Fairview has failed to marshal the evidence in support
of the District Court's Findings of Fact.

Second, Fairview has

failed to identify anywhere in the record in which it preserved
the issues it now raises on appeal.

Third, Fairview has failed

to attach the District Court's Findings of Fact and a transcript of the District Court's Oral Decision.
4

These deficien-

Fairview erroneously states that the District Court
found that the phone call that Ms. Rackley had made to Sharon
Mellen "was the only factor which predicated Ms. Rackley's
termination." Aplt. Brief at 9. This statement is not found
anywhere in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered
by the Court. See R. at 354-360; Addendum at 1-7. Instead,
the District Court ultimately found that "Defendant's violation
of that [right of residents to know about personal monies]
public policy was a substantial factor (and, according to the
evidence, the only factor) in defendant's termination of
plaintiff's employment." R. at 356; Addendum at 3.
13

cies prohibit Fairview from prevailing in this appeal.
2.

At trial, Fairview failed to present evidence

that Ms. Rackley was terminated for any reason other than that
her conduct was in furtherance of public policy.

Without such

evidence, Fairview cannot establish that Ms. Rackley was fired
for any other reason than that she took steps geared toward
furthering the important public policy of residents being
informed that funds belonging to them had arrived at the
facility.
3.

The District Court correctly ruled that Fairview

terminated Ms. Rackley because she engaged in conduct (notifying a resident that money had arrived for her) that implicated
clear and substantial public policy.

This public policy is

evidenced in the Utah Constitution and in federal and state
statutes and regulations.

This Court can affirm the District

Court's ruling that clear and substantial public policy was
implicated in this case by finding the existence of such a
public policy in one or more of the provisions cited by Ms.
Rackley at trial.
4.

Under relevant Utah case law, Ms. Rackley!s

conduct in notifying a resident that funds had arrived was
conduct furthering the substantial public policy of notifying a
resident that her funds had arrived.
5.

Fairview takes a number of positions on appeal
14

that are contrary to those asserted by Fairview at trial. At
trial, Fairview acknowledged that for a termination to implicate public policy, it was not necessary that a violation of
the law occur.

On appeal, Fairview suggests that a violation

of law is essential.

Fairview also argued at trial that Utah

case law required that employees pursue violations of public
policy internally.

On appeal, Fairview argues that employees

must report violations to "authorities."

Fairview should be

judicially estopped from taking contrary

positions on appeal

when its arguments failed at trial.
V.
A.

ARGUMENT

DEFICIENCIES IN FAIRVIEW1S BRIEF PROHIBIT FAIRVIEW
FROM PREVAILING IN THIS APPEAL.
1.

Fairview has Failed to Marshal the Evidence in
Support of the District Court's Findings of
Fact.

Fairview's appeal implicitly challenges a number of
the District Court's findings of fact.

It is a well estab-

lished principle of appellate law that "it is an appellant's
burden to marshal all the evidence that supports the court's
finding and then demonstrate why, even viewing it in the light
most favorable to the court below, it is insufficient to
support the finding made."

General Glass Corp. v. Mast Constr.

Co.. 766 P.2d 429, 433 (Utah App. 1988).

If the appellant

fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's
15

factual findings, the appellate court will only review the
trial court!s legal conclusions, but will consider its findings
of fact supported.

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah

1991) .
Fairview has abysmally failed to marshal the evidence
in support of the District Court's findings of fact.

This

Court should, accordingly, not even consider disturbing the
District Court's factual findings in this case.
2.

Fairview has Failed to Identify the Preservation
of the Issues Raised on Appeal.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure
provides that when the issues for review are outlined, there
shall be "citation to the record showing that the issue was
preserved in the trial court."

Utah R. App. P. 24(a) (5) (A).

Fairview has failed to cite where the issues presented were
supposedly preserved in the District Court proceedings.
3.

Fairview has Failed to Attach the Findings of
Fact and a Transcript of the District Court's
Oral Decision.

Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also
provides that the brief of the appellant shall contain "those
parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to
the determination of the appeal, such as . . . findings of fact
and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of
the court's oral decision . . .."
16

Utah R. App. P.

24(a)(11)(C).
Ms. Rackley includes, in this Brief, the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law (Addendum at pages 1-7) and the
transcript of the oral decision.
B.

(Addendum at pages 8-20).

FAIRVIEW FAILED TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE IN THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS THAT MS. RACKLEY WAS TERMINATED FOR ANY REASON OTHER THAN THAT HER CONDUCT WAS
IN FURTHERANCE OF PUBLIC POLICY.
When Judge Iwasaki made his oral ruling at the end of

this case, he made a number of important observations.
he found that Ms. Rackley had been fired.

First,

Tr. Vol. 5 at 1233.

Second, under Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 837 (Utah
1992), he proceeded to analyze the three-prong test.

First,

did the "termination implicate a clear and substantial public
policy?

Yes it did."

Tr. Vol. 5 at 1233.5

Judge Iwasaki then

moved on to the third factor: "[v]iolation of the public policy
must be a substantial factor in the plaintiff's termination."
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1234.

The Judge found that:

The defense, on the other hand, took and maintained
the sole defense in that she wasn't fired, she quit,
and did not present any nexus to this Court, from the
person who has the obligation of hiring and firing,
Mr. Petersen, as to whether or not, if he didnft--if
she didnft quit, what factors were present that would
substantiate a firing.
The defendants [sic] chose to put all their eggs in
5

The public policy at issue, the rights of residents in
nursing homes, is discussed at pages 20-31
infra.
17

one basket. The defendants chose to say this—this
person quit and there is no—nothing to weigh. Once
that fails, there's nothing before the Court.
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1235.
The only conceivable significance of the evidence
regarding Ms. Rackley's supposed tardiness or absenteeism on
the job was its supposedly being a cause for termination.
Vol. 1 at 278-79.

Tr.

Fairview elicited testimony regarding such

things, but never asserted in any fashion that they were a
basis for termination.

Fairview, having taken the position

that Ms. Rackley was not fired, cannot now hope to convince
this Court that she was fired for any reason other than that
found by Judge Iwasaki —

her taking steps geared toward

furthering the important public policy of residents being
informed that funds belonging to them had arrived at the
facility.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT FAIRVIEW
TERMINATED THE EMPLOYMENT OF MS. RACKLEY IN VIOLATION
OF THE PUBLIC POLICY OF THE STATE OF UTAH.
Utah law allows an employee fired in violation of

public policy to recover tort damages.

Retherford v. AT&T

Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 959 (Utah 1992); see also Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1281-85 (Utah 1992); Heslop v.
Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828, 837 (Utah 1992).

The public policy

exception to the employment at-will doctrine has been recognized because "an action for wrongful discharge is an appropri18

ate way to protect both the public interest and the employee
from an employer's oppressive use of power."

Hodges v. Gibson

Products Co., 811 P.2d 151, 166 (Utah 1991).
The Utah cases analyzing this issue provide guidance
in analyzing whether an employee is discharged "in a manner or
for a reason that contravened a 'clear and substantial public
policy' of the State of Utah, a public policy rooted in Utah's
constitution or statutes."

Retherford, 844 at 966.

"Clear and

substantial public policy" is a policy that is of "overarching
importance to the public as opposed to the parties only," and
whether the policy is so significant that we should place it
"beyond the reach of contract."

Id. at n.9.

The Utah Supreme

Court has also acknowledged that termination in violation of
public policy can arise where federal or other state laws are
involved.

Peterson, 832 P.2d at 1283.
The District Court identified, in its Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. at 354-60; Addendum at 1-7),
seven constitutional, statutory, and regulatory indices of
public policy that are implicated in Fairview's termination of
Ms. Rackley's employment:
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution
42 U.S.C. §§ 3058g(a)(3) and (5)
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-3-201, et seq.
42 U.S.C. § 1396(i) (6)
Utah Admin. Code § R432-150-4
19

42 C.F.R. § 483.10
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law p. 6, 1 1 (R. at 359;
Addendum at page 6). This Court can affirm the District
Court's legal conclusions in this case by finding substantial
public policy evidenced in one or more of these constitutional,
statutory, and/or regulatory provisions, or, for that matter,
any other satisfactory clear and substantial index of public
policy.
Article I, Section 1, of the Utah Constitution
provides, in pertinent part, as follows: "[a]11 [persons] have
the inherent and inalienable right to . . . acquire, possess
and protect property . . .."

(emphasis added).

Article I,

Section 27, of the Utah Constitution provides, "[f]requent
recurrence to fundamental principles is essential to the
security of individual rights . . .."

(emphasis added).

These

provisions establish core fundamental values in this State most relevant to this case, the right of an individual (such as
Muriel Mellen) to exercise dominion over property.

It goes

without saying — "knowledge is power" - that a person, especially one such as Muriel Mellen (not under guardianship or
conservatorship), must know that she has property before she
has a chance to exercise dominion over it.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-3-301, et seq., evidence Utah's
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The Utah Legislature has explicitly set forth the
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Utah Code Ann, §

62A-3-2C- is entir.iea "Legislative r.. ndings - Purpose - Ombudsman

;-,--• ~ • • provides :
The Legislature finds and declares m a r u:ie
aging citizens of this state should be assisted in
asserting their civil and human rights as patients,
residents and clients of long-rerm care facilities
created to serve their specialized needs and problems; and for the health, safety and welfare of these
citizens, the state should take appropriate action
through an adequate legal framework ^n address their
difficulties,

Fairview contends (Aplt. Brief at 21) that none of
the provisions cited by Ms. Rackley articulates an underlying
public policy.

Fairview also suggests that none of the subject

indices of public policy specifically contemplates Ms.
Rackleyfs conduct with regard to Muriel Mullen's money.

If

this Court were to adopt this analytical framework, it would
essentially be ignoring the policy underlying the developing
line of Utah cases in this area.

Accepting Fairview's argument

would be tantamount to decreeing that all the specifics of a
given factual scenario would have to be specifically anticipated by constitutional provision, statute, or regulation, in
order that a claim for wrongful termination for violation of
public policy could proceed.

Ms. Rackley respectfully suggests

that the law does not work that way.
The Utah Legislature has enunciated Utah's public
policy underlying the Long-Term Care Ombudsman Program in terms
satisfactorily explicit with regard to the instant dispute.
The term "civil and human rights" certainly contemplates a
person's right to control her own money.
Also pertinent are 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3(c) (6) and
1396r (c)(6), which set forth requirements regarding the protection of funds of residents of nursing homes.

Ms. Rackley

acknowledges that Muriel Mellen did not authorize Fairview to
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B.
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(Emphasis added).6
The provisions of law referenced in the District
Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of law support the
clear and substantial public policy that persons (including
elderly nursing home residents) have the right to control their
property.
Evidence that steps taken by Ms. Rackley, in furtherance of Muriel Mellen's obtaining awareness that money belonging to her had arrived at the Fairview facility, implicated a
clear and substantial public policy can be found in the testimony of Fairview1s own high-level employees.
Joseph Petersen, the general manager and vice president of the corporation that owns Fairview acknowledged at
trial that "residents are absolutely entitled to get their
money themselves."

Tr. Vol. 3 at 754 (emphasis added).

When cross-examined by Ms. Rackley1s counsel, Mr.
Petersen himself acknowledged, without objection by Fairview1s
counsel,

that terminating an employee for protecting a resi-

6

42 C.F.R. § 483.10(c) provides an almost identical
provision: "[p]rotection of resident funds. (1) The resident
has the right to manage his or her financial affairs, and the
facility may not require residents to deposit their personal
funds with the facility."
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(Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Would you agree with me,
for the sake of discussion, that if your company,
through you or anyone else in management, fired
Cathleen Rackley because she wn- trying tc "!-' Muriel
Mellen know that Muriel Mel1 en had money there, wr^n
nobody else in administration would tell Muriel
Mellen that, would you agree that that was wrong,
fire her for that?
(Mr. Petersen) To fire her--:.
somebody?
Yes.
Absolutely not, i t wouldn't be wrong.
It wou1dnf t be wrong to fire her for that?
No. I mean, it wouldn't be right for a facility to
fire anybody f o r — i t 1 s
against the law, i 3—i*'
jainst wha4- we ^^a^^
for.
And if, for the sa.rx .,1 uiscuss:.:,::, ^ : ,. J our company
decided to fire Muriel — or Cathleen Rackley, ;:.
broader sense, because she was someone who was perceived by your company to be someone who was devoted
to protecting the rights of these people legally and
as a matter of dignity, including their funds, wc-.ld
you think; that was wrong?
I do not believe that was
.^ ..ao,-.
If she were fired for thai:, would you agree with * -e
that that would be wronq, a very bad thing for y;"- *r
company to have done""
It would not only '— "••
- l,
3 at: 7 64-65 (emphasis added) .
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iriaroney, a

rig-time managerial employee of E air view:
v^wv^^. *- + .... . r.acK.ie>; Let 1 - ^ay *:zi the sa:<e cf
discussion that Sharon Mellen, t ased or. everythi: •
that yc : learned while you were rhere |_at Fairv:' " had not oeen given the authority to have any pov
over Muriel's money; are you witn me so far?
(Sallie Maroney
Yes.
Let's say sh'-'d not been gi ven any written autncr^^y
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A.

to do that, and then she did it anyway; do you see
anything wrong with that?
Yes.

Tr. Vol. 1 at 226 (emphasis added).
Even Sharon Mellen acknowledged the importance of
notifying residents when their checks arrive and that Muriel
Mellen had a right to be notified that her funds had arrived:
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.

(Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Ma1am, you don't dispute
the idea that your mother-in-law, as a patient of
Fairview or a resident, had the right to know when
her money got there, do you?
(Sharon Mellen) No.
You think it's—you—you agree that it's important
for people in her situation to know when—
Yes.
—they get money?
Yes.
And am I correct in my understanding, I know there's
been other testimony in this case, but was it your
understanding that Karleen Merkley or whoever at
Fairview West you were communicating with regularly,
had something set up so that you would be informed
about Muriel's money and she wouldn't be?
No.
That was not your intention?
WellYes or no.
COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: If you can't answer it yes or
no—
(Sharon Mellen) I don't remember what—I remember
talking to Karleen, waiting for the check to come,
talking to Karleen, asking her every month if it
came, if it had come through. I mentioned to Sallie
that I wanted to get her a wheelchair and they knew
how Muriel felt about her money and we wanted to—she
said, well, go check on them and see—we'll talk to
Muriel along—we decided just to kinda work on Muriel
a little and, you know—
(Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Work on her?
Well, we wanted to talk her into a wheelchair.
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A F Judge Iwasaki cogently observed, with respect to
;h paternalistic and supposedly well-intentioned actions:
While . .. ; . paternalist! .: decision on the
parr of Fairview r. o keep this information away from
Muriel Mellen, my personal observation is, those are
the people that you have to watch out the worst for.
Those who are making decisions :.:i [sic] your behalf,
without allowing you to make your own decisions,
those people that are looking out for my best interest are thos= that 1 have to look at the very, very
hardest
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of that type. Muriel Mellen knows exactly what she's doing."
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1219 (emphasis added).

By Fairview's own de-

scription, Muriel Mellen was capable and had a right to know
about her own funds.
Further support for the clear and substantial public
policy implicated by the facts of this case can be found in the
Employee Warning Notices given to Karleen Merkley and Sallie
Maroney (copies attached to Aplt. Brief as Ex. "C" of Addendum) . Both warnings state, "you may not under any circumstances deliver funds or articals [sic] belonging to a resident
to another person without the patients [sic] knowledge."
Ms. Rackley also presented evidence of the clear and
substantial public policy implicated in this case through the
testimony of Ana Lird, the lead ombudsman for Salt Lake County
Aging Services.
Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Ana Lird testified:

(Counsel for Ms. Rackley) Okay. Why is it important
to protect residents1 funds from any kind of abuse?
(Ana Lird) Many of the residents are not able to
speak for themselves or they don't understand about
their rights, they don't understand they are—have
the right to know about her person—their personal
allowance, their personal accounts, how that works;
then in general, they have the right that anybody
else [sic] in the community.
Okay. Have you seen that written in any documents,
about the rights that residents have to be aware of
and to manage their own finances?
Yeah. They are part of the—of the law.
What—have you—can you tell us where you've seen it
in the law, particularly? If you know?
That is the—is the part of the O.B.R.A., where the—
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Is that in a Federal law?
In the Federal law,
And you have been interpreting and applying this Jaw
for a long number of years?
Uh huh, yes.
And you were, as of 1993 and 1994?
Yes,
a x80-81 (emphasis addec
The District Court's conch, _

termination r'f

!^?

public poji::v

;

review of K^& ^ra'

*

. _ .*

Rackley volated *-e clear -*:> : substantial
. *di-. *_
I-P^, constitutional provision-, ^n

tions iir^.:ca:e.

regula".r parent

that sub-4 ant: J a] stare ?; : federal concern ror cue. n^r.is of
persons

~t -

'

^sons; to exercise

control over their property is abundantly manifest i n the law.
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:

the infirm.

On a more fundamental level, an individual's

control over her own property rises to the level of a constitutional right.
Fairview curiously asserts that the interests of
society are "not substantial in that nursing home residents
make up a very small portion of the population."
at 31) (emphasis added).

(Aplt. Brief

First, Fairview provides no support

for this statement (perhaps because there is no such conceivable support — and, certainly, no support in the record of this
case).

Second, whatever the percentage, this analysis is

inappropriate in deciding what is of significant public concern.8
Third, the public policy concerns that are implicated
in this case are clearly evidenced by the testimony of many of
the witnesses in this case.

Joseph Petersen, Sallie Maroney,

Karleen Merkley, and even Sharon Mellen all agreed that Muriel
8

Fairview also claims that since a witness, Ann E. Lee,
who is employed by the Department of Health did not see anything wrong with Fairview1s conduct, then there is no public
policy implicated in this case. (Aplt. Brief at 31). Fairview
mischaracterizes the implications of the testimony.
First,
the witness is not the judge and cannot make legal conclusions.
Second, the witness only testified regarding her narrow experience with certain regulations.
It is strained and erroneous reasoning to conclude that
because one administrator in a State program concludes that
Fairviewrs conduct did not violate a certain set of laws and
regulations, that no public policy concerns are implicated in
this case.
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quently:
But tl le fact remains that Muriel Mellen was not
incompetent, Muriel Mellen was not designated to be
someone who needed a guardian, Muriel Mellen was not
someone who was under a conservatorship, Muriel
Mellen knew what was happening and she should have
had the opportunity to know that she had funds there
and to have some input into her funds.

While it v ery wel 1 may have been in al 1 good
faith and honesty, a best decision to make, that
still begs the issue: Muriel Mellen had the right to
be told that shea had that money, and the fact that
Sharon Mellen may have told her at; some later time,
also begs the issue.
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1237-38 (emphasis added).
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The Utah Constitution, Utah and federal statutes and
regulations, Utah case law, and the testimony of Fairview
employees all support the District Court's Findings and Conclusions that Ms. Rackley was wrongfully fired in violation of the
public policy of the State of Utah, and there is no reason for
this Court to disturb those findings or conclusions in the
District Court's Judgment.
D.

MS. RACKLEY'S CONDUCT
Fairview contends that Ms. Rackley!s conduct in

protecting Muriel Mellen's rights does not constitute conduct
furthering public policy.

Fairview cites Fox v. MCI Communica-

tions Corp,. 931 P.2d 857 (Utah 1997), in support of this
contention.

Fox involved an employee who reported to manage-

ment that other employees in the company were altering accounts
on a computer system so that those other employees could
improve their commissions and sales levels.

That conduct did

not cause harm to customers, and the employer was not harmed in
that it tolerated the conduct.

Id. at 8 61.

The plaintiff

reported the conduct of her co-workers to management, claimed
that the conduct constituted a violation of computer crime
laws, and ultimately filed a wrongful termination claim,
alleging that her termination was in violation of public
policy.

The Utah Supreme Court held that reporting the conduct
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In addition, Fairview mischaracterizes the holding in
Winter.

There the plaintiff filed a pro se complaint and

prosecuted the entire case without the aid of a lawyer.
917.

Id. at

The court noted that (1) the law regarding wrongful

termination in violation of public policy is "in a state of
development, and at this time, there are no established fundamental rules of law in this jurisdiction that support his
claims" (Id. at 918, n.2), and (2) the court could not become
an advocate for the plaintiff and without any legal analysis or
authority, could not address his wrongful termination claim.
Id. at 919.

Had the plaintiff in Winter brought his claim with

competent counsel, it is not clear that his claim would have
failed in 1991.

In addition, given the developments in Utah

law since 1991, it is not clear that the plaintiff's case would
necessarily fail today.
When Ms. Rackley found out about Muriel Mullen's
funds and Fairview's decision purposefully to keep from Muriel
Mellen the fact of the arrival at Fairview of those funds, Ms.
Rackley went directly to Muriel Mellen and informed her that
those funds had arrived.
In this case, there was a clear victim (Ms. Mellen),
and the violation of her rights inferred in Fairview's denying
her information regarding the arrival of her funds.
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Fairview's suggestion that Ms, Rackley's conduct did
i * 1urther public po1icy because she did r\ot report the pub1ic
puj. icy violation to "authorities" is thus directly contradii "Led
bv Hesi op.
The D i s t r i c t Court" m
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his analysis of Ms. Rackley's conduct in this way:
If in fact, she was fired for the phone call, if
in fact, she was fired for the looking out for resident's rights, I agree with Mr. Petersen, that
shouldn't be done. That's exactly what happened
here. She was fired for conduct in attempting to
solidify and to—and to preserve patient's and resident's rights. Muriel Mellen had the right to know.
She wasn't given that right. Ms. Rackley did what
she could to try and rectify the situation. Because
of that, she was discharged. Accordingly, all three
prongs of Heslop has [sic] been met.
Tr. Vol. 5 at 1239.
E.

JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL
Fairview is judicially estopped from arguing on

appeal that Fairview's conduct toward Muriel Mellen did not
violate the law, and accordingly, that the termination of Ms.
Rackley was not in violation of public policy.

As explained by

this Court in Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr,
791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah App. 1990):
Generally in legal proceedings a party with knowledge
of all the facts will not be allowed to take a position, pursue that position to fruition, and later,
with no substantial change in circumstances, return
to attack the validity of the prior position or the
outcome flowing from it. See, 28 Am. Jur. 2d
Estoppel & Waiver §§68-70 (1966).
The principle of judicial estoppel has also been described by
this Court in Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Insurance Co.,
829 P.2d 142, 148, n. 4 (Utah App. 1992), as follows:
A doctrine which seeks to prevent a party in legal
36

proceed!ngs from takii ig a pos itioi i, pursuing that
position to fruition, and later returning to attack
the validity of the prior position or the outcome
flowing from it. Condas v. Condas, 618 P.2d 4 91, 4 96
(Utah 1980) ; Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank
v. Mehr, 791 P.2d 217, 220 (Utah Ct. App, 1990). The
purposes underlying the doctrine include avoiding
-•consistency, duplicity and waste of time. Seattle_ est Nat f l Bank v. Marshall, 31 Wash. App. 339, 641
P. 2d 1194, 1: " '1982) .
I
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During closing arguments

counsel for Fairview acknowledged:

THE COURT: Do you agree, or is it your position that
all violations of public policy has [sic] to be a
violation of law; is that your position?
COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: Well, that 1 - co:t of the
position,
THE COURT:
rtt^,
. ..^:COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: But•• . THE COURT; --that's like a n c d e pregnant; I mean,
is — is your position tnat---that; :*. har to be a violation of law befor€> it's a v;r' r - * * r\;blic policy?
COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: No„«
THE COURT: All right
' COUNSEL FOR FAIRVIEW: It's i lot LI lat i larrow of a
' reading.

Tr. Vol.. 5 at 1218 -19 ' (emphasis added).
Fairview i Iow argues, i n :1 1:s Brief, that 'f [n] othj ng i n
t:\e

language of Ms . Rackley ' s cited legal provisioi is, si iggests,

clearly r-v" otherwise, that Fal rview w-- r,v. hibited fr;;: han- c . ...;.y y\^L , e . ...

ei i' s f ui ids i
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Aplt. Brief at 13.

Fairview suggests that if and because

Fairview did not violate the law, no clear and substantial
public policy is implicated in this case,

Fairview took,

through counsel, an apparently different position at trial.
Fairview should be held to be estopped from arguing a contrary
position on appeal.
Fairview also at trial took, through counsel, another
position apparently contrary to that which it now takes with
regard to Ms. Rackley's duty under Heslop.

Counsel stated,

"part of what Heslop also requires is that actions be pursued
internally.

Internally."

Tr. Vol. 5 at 1203.

Directly

contrary to this position is the following assertion in
Fairview' s Brief, "our Supreme Court has declined to recognize
public policy claims based upon an employee!s internal complaints."

Aplt. Brief at 32. On appeal, Fairview should not

now (having failed at trial) be allowed to take a contrary
position.
VI.

CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT

Ms. Rackley urges the Court, based on the foregoing
analysis, on the record of this case, and on the law of the
State of Utah, to uphold Judge Iwasaki's decision, and to
affirm the Judgment of the District Court.
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<>

day of March, 1998

PETER C. COLLINS
TARA L. ISAACSON
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, 1..,.
Attorneys for Cathleei
Rackley
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ,
I hereby certify that, on the

6

day of March,

1998, I caused to be served two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CATHLEEN L. RACKLEY by
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Danny Quintana
QUINTANA & ASSOCIATES
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

HAND DELIVERY
£_ U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX)
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ADDENDUM

Peter C. Collins (#0700)
BUGDEN, COLLINS & MORTON, L.C.
4021 South 700 East, #400
Salt Lake City, UT 84107
Telephone: (801) 2 65-1888

Uwj.Uiy v. v..K

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CATHLEEN L. RACKLEY,

:
:
:

Plaintiff,
-vFAIRVIEW CARE CENTERS,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendant.

:
:
:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Case No. 940904822CV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

:

This case came on for bench trial before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, on October 29 and 3 0 and November 1, 8,
and 15, 1996.

Plaintiff was represented by Peter C. Collins.

Defendant was represented by Danny Quintana and Lucinda Lomas.
A follow-up in

camera

hearing, concerning the question of

Ms. Rackley , s compensable damages associated with the purchase
of items related to her pursuing work as a peace officer, was
held with the Court and Mr. Collins present in chambers and
with Mr. Quintana participating by telephone, on December 4,
1996.
Having considered the evidence (including testimony
and exhibits), and having also considered the statements,
representations, and arguments of counsel, and being fully

advised in the premises, and good cause appearing, the Court
now makes its following Findings of Fact and enters its
following Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Cathleen Rackley worked as an employee

of defendant from November 1, 1993 through February 28, 1994.
2.

Plaintiff was an able, conscientious, and

diligent employee.
3.

On a number of occasions during that period of

employment, plaintiff took actions that were disliked by
members of defendant's management and that were geared toward
honoring and upholding the law and protecting the rights of
defendant's employees and the residents of defendant's nursing
home facility (the west side Salt Lake City facility) of which
plaintiff served as Administrator during the entirety of her
employment with defendant.
4.

On February 28, 1994, defendant terminated the

employment of plaintiff, against her wishes.
5.

Defendant's said termination of plaintiff's

employment implicated a clear and substantial public policy, to
wit:

the right of the residents of defendant's Salt Lake City

west side facility (including resident Muriel Mellen) to be
informed of the fact that resident personal monies had arrived
at the facility.
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6.

Defendant violated that public policy by, in

terminating plaintiff's employment, punishing plaintiff for
engaging in conduct furthering that policy.
7.

Defendant's violation of that public policy was

a substantial factor (and, according to the evidence, the only
factor) in defendant's termination of plaintiff's employment.
8.

Plaintiff was being compensated, at the time of

the termination of her employment, at the rate of $27,000.00
per year.
9.

Plaintiff did not obtain, despite reasonable and

diligent efforts in the interim, a new career-related job until
March 16, 1995, when she obtained employment with the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Office.
10.

The principal amount of plaintiff's gross,

career-related loss of income is, thus, $28,125.00.
11.

In the interim between the termination of her

employment with defendant and the time she started her job with
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, plaintiff earned
$5,700.00 working as a school hall monitor; and that amount
should be deducted from the said $28,125.00 figure.
12.

The net principal amount of plaintiff's loss-of-

income special damages is, thus, $22,425.00.
13.

Plaintiff incurred additional special damages in

the principal amount of $591.99, representing the reasonable
costs of the service weapon and accessories plaintiff purchased

3
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as a requirement of her peace officer training and, ultimately,
her obtaining employment as a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff.
14.

The total principal amount of plaintiff's

special damages sustained as results of defendant's termination
of her employment is $23,016.99.
15.

Plaintiff suffered substantial mental and

emotional distress and suffering, as proximate results of
defendant's said termination of her employment; and plaintiff's
general damages, in connection with and by reason of that
suffering, are in the amount of $3,500.00.
16.

The principal amount of plaintiff's special

damages, plus the amount of plaintiff's general damages, totals
$26,516.99.
17.

It was reasonably foreseeable to defendant, and

it was in fact foreseen by defendant, that plaintiff would be
required to retain legal counsel to seek compensation for
defendant's termination of her employment.
18.

Plaintiff in fact was required to obtain legal

counsel to represent her to seek such compensation.
19.

Plaintiff's attorney's fee is contractually set

at 4 0% of all sums recovered from defendant in this action, and
that is a reasonable fee in the circumstances of this case.
20.

In addition to her special and general damages

fixed hereinabove, plaintiff is entitled to recover, from
defendant, the following sums:
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a.

interest (pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-

27-44 and 15-1-1) at the legal rate of 10% per annum, from
February 28, 1994 to the date Judgment is entered herein; and
b.

her costs of court, pursuant to Rule 54(b)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in an amount to be fixed
by the Court.
21.

Accordingly, the amount of the Judgment to be

entered herein shall be:
a.

$26,516.99 (compensatory damages (special

damages plus general damages)); plus
b.

interest on special damages ($6,430.38 as

of December 15, 1996 plus $6.40 per diem thereafter until
Judgment is entered); plus
c.

40% of the sum of items (a) and (b)

($13,180.15 as of December 15, 1996, plus $2.56 per

diem

thereafter until Judgment is entered).
22.

The amount of that Judgment shall be augmented

by the following:
a.

plaintiff's compensable costs of court (to

be determined by the Court); plus

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Defendant unlawfully terminated the employment

of plaintiff in violation of the public policy of the State of

5
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Utah, including but not limited to the clear and substantial
public policy considerations set forth in the following:
Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 27 of the Utah Constitution
42 U.S.C. §§ 3058g(a)(3) and (5)
Utah Code Ann, §§ 62A-3-201, et seq.
42 U.S.C. § 1396(i)(6)
Utah Admin. Code § R432-150-4
42 C.F.R. § 483.10
2.

Plaintiff is entitled to Judgment against

defendant for her special damages, her general damages,
interest on special damages from February 28, 1994 to the date
Judgment is entered, and her costs of Court;
3.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of plaintiff

and against defendant, in the amount indicated by paragraph 21
of the foregoing Findings of Fact;
4.

The amount of the Judgment shall be augmented by

the amounts indicated in paragraph 22 of the foregoing Findings
of Fact; and
5.

The entire amount of the Judgment (including

that augmentation) shall bear interest at the Judgment interest
rate as of the date Judgment is entered.
DATED this ^

'

day of , / V ? 9 ^ '

, 1996.

GLENN K. IWASAKI
District Judge
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X '

V
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
cd-

I hereby certify that, on the

day of December,

199 6, I caused to be served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW by
the method indicated below, and addressed to the following:
Danny Quintana
Lucinda Lomas
Judge Building, Suite 73 5
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

HAND DELIVERY
U.S. MAIL
OVERNIGHT MAIL
TELECOPY (FAX)
(521-4625)
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2
3
4
5
6

of things that they do in that place in the course of their
corporate life that aren't against the law, just like if
you—but—but if they do something that violates a public
policy and that public policy are implicated as they are
clearly in this case, then it is a violation of law and
there is liability.
The fact that somebody doesn't break a—a Fish &

7
8

Game law when he goes out and kills somebody doesn't mean
that he hasn't done something wrong, and vice versa.

9
There's any number of things we can talk about.

If they did

ib
some things that weren't in violation of the law, that
11

doesn't somehow elevate their conduct in other realms to
12

legality.
13

We're—we're satisfied, your Honor.

I've talked

14

enough.

Unless you have any questions, at this point, I'd

15

submit it, your Honor.
16

THE COURT:

Thank you, Mr. Collins.

17

The Court has had ample opportunity to hear the
18

evidence, more than ample to mull over the issues and to, at
19

this time, to be prepared to render a decision.

Before I do

20

that, however, or part of my decision, I want to make some
21

observations.
22

I do not buy the proposition that plaintiff,
2'3

Cathleen Rackley, in this matter is a money-grubbing
24

plaintiff who hired on to this job with the sole purpose of
25

1231

OuS-

1
2
3

driving this nursing home to its demise economically and to
attempt to gain whatever advantage that she may have by
virtue of a four-month employment with the defendant.
I do not accept the proposition that her only

4
5
6
7
8
9
lb

interest in this matter was financial and for her own
benefit and disregarding all of the other aspects of—of her|
testimony.
I do find her to be conscientious, to be honest,
hard-working and committed, at least during the time that
she was employed in nursing homes or other facilities,
committed to rights of both employees and—and residents.

11
12
13
14
15
16

On the other hand, I don't buy the proposition
that Fairview Nursing Home was a pig sty.

I don't—I don't

accept the proposition that it was in—it was in a horribly
terribly—terrible position prior to plaintiff's hiring on
and only because of plaintiff's herculean efforts did any
changes come about.

17
18
19
2b
21
22

It appears to me that based upon the surveys that
have been admitted here, that the Fairview facility was a
well-run facility, and that—that's a relative term, because
it's a well-run facility as to nursing homes. And having
the minimum wage employees, the high turn-over, they do what|
they can do and they do it as best they can.

Sure, this is

23
not the Taj Majal of nursing homes; on the other hand, it is
24
not the pig sty which it has been represented to be.
25
1232
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Regardless of which, those are observations that I
want everyone to hear before I get into the meats of this
case, the meat of this case.
Pursuant to Heslop, I must find—well, even prior
to getting into any holdings of any cases, the issue before
the Court is whether there was a firing, whether there was a
constructive firing or whether there was a—an affirmative
act to quit by the plaintiff.
The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
and the totality of the circumstance, including the
testimony of those concerned who were at that meeting in
late February, that the defendant was fired—I mean that the
plaintiff was fired.
Only upon her response to the firing, was there a
re-offer of the—of the job, and that was never accepted.
It can't be a unilateral re-offering or re-hiring, it has to
be an acceptance.

Once someone's fired, there must then be

an offer and an acceptance.
firing.

That wasn't done.

It's a

I don't even have to get into constructive firing.

That was a firing.
Once that's determined, and now looking at Heslop,
the Court must determine whether or not the three-prong test
of Heslop has been met in this.

Number one, was the

employee—employee's termination implicate a clear and
substantial public policy?

Yes, it did.
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10

The public policy,

the general public policy is rights of residents in nursing
homes.
2
3
4
5
6
7

The specific public policy, which I agree with
upon questioning of Mr. Collins, is the right of residents
to know what their property is, whether it's financial or
otherwise, to have a determination, a say in what happens to|
that property.

That's the public policy and that has been

invoked in this matter.
6

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
2b
21
22
23
24
25

Second, the employer must require the employee to
violate that policy or punish them for conducting—for
conduct furthering it.
Let me move on to the third one. Violation of the'
public policy must be a substantial factor in the
plaintiff's termination.
Let me discuss that third prong first.

I don't

know how many times during this trial, I mentioned and I
allowed, testimony of plaintiff's action, over objection as
to what she was doing on the job, and I don't know how many
times I mentioned specifically Heslop in saying that.
I must weigh, if I find there's a firing, I must
weigh whether or not the violation of the public policy was
a substantial factor in the plaintiff's termination.

Once

doing that over objection, it appeared to me obvious that
there must be some evidence that if this was a firing, what
factors were considered regarding the firing.
1234
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The defense, on the other hand, took and
maintained the sole defense in that she wasn't fired, she
quit, and did not present any nexus to this Court, from the
person who has the obligation of hiring and firing, Mr.
Petersen, as to whether or not, if he didn't—if she didn't
quit, what factors were present that would substantiate a
firing.
This is an at-will employment.

There needn't be

any grounds at all given for any firing, but once it's in
the firing and a violation of public policy, I must weigh
whether or not that firing was a substantial factor in the
plaintiff's termination.

There wasn't any evidence to the

contrary.
The defendants chose to put all their eggs in one
basket.

The defendants chose to say this—this person quit

and there is no—nothing to weigh.

Once that fails, there's

nothing before the Court.
It could have very easily been, in the same way
that Mr. Collins had alternative theories as to his
recovery, a question to Mr. Petersen.

Mr. Petersen, I

understand your position that she quit; however, pursuant to
Heslop, the Court must consider the substantial factoring
and weighing of these factors.

What factors would have led

you to fire her if you would have fired her?
evidence, absolutely none.
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There was no

There was evidence from a lot of other people that
indicated she had missed a Christmas party, that she was
late, that she wasn't there, that she had a bad attitude,
that she didn't communicate with people; but not one word
from Mr. Petersen indicating that those were factors that he
would have considered in firing her.

How can I weigh, how

can I determine whether there's a substantial factor in the
violation of public policy against other reasons for firing,
if there was no other reason submitted to the Court?
So, even if I do consider that, which has not been]
presented to me in any competent form, but even if I do
consider that, I have to then really read between the lines,
because the—the ostensible reasons for firing, all of which]
were not presented by Mr. Petersen, but were mentioned in
the January meeting, had all been taken care of.

In Mr.

Petersen's own testimony and handwriting.
He had indicated on that exhibit, and I don't know]
which one specifically, taken care of, not an issue; so what]
does that leave?

It leaves then, ostensibly, the telephone

call to Sharon Mellen at work.
Well, what is that related to?

The reason for thej

telephone call to Sharon Mellen at work was the concern the
plaintiff had for the possible violation of Muriel Mellen's
right to know that she had that money, that she had the
$720.
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I don't criticize Sharon Mellen.

1
2
3

not a thief.

Sharon Mellen is

Sharon Mellen did not steal this money from

Muriel Mellen.
I don't criticize the facility for working with

4
Sharon Mellen to, I guess, protect Muriel Mellen from her
5
own best desires and interest of having the money because of
6
all of the other problems that were attendant with Muriel
7
Mellen.
8
But the fact remains that Muriel Mellen was not
9
incompetent, Muriel Mellen was not designated to be someone
10
who needed a guardian, Muriel Mellen was not someone who was
11
under a conservatorship, Muriel Mellen knew what was
12
happening and she should have had the opportunity to know
13
that she had funds there and to have some input into her
14
funds.
15
Sharon Mellen is a wonderful daughter-in-law, as
16
far as I'm concerned, if she's going to support this woman
17
during the time that she didn't get her checks.

Once again,

18
I'm not critical of Sharon Mellen at all.
19
On the other hand, the plaintiff very well may
20
have jumped the gun, maybe should have talked to other
21
people who were more conversant with the Mellen file, maybe
22
should not have even called Ms. Mellen at work; but that's
23
not the issues here.

The issues are that Muriel Mellen had

24
the right to know and—and the testimony that the Court is
25
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convinced occurred was that there was a—not a conspiracy,
1
because that has bad connotations—was an agreement that
2
people not tell Ms. Mellen—Muriel Mellen that she has
3
money, because once she has that knowledge, then she wants
4
to leave the facility, she wants to do all these foolish
5
things, but that's her decision-to make.
6
While it was a paternalistic decision on the part
7
of Fairview to keep this information away from Muriel
8
Mellen, my personal observations is, those are the people
9
that you have to watch out the worst for.

Those who are

1b
making decisions in your behalf, without allowing you to
11
make your own decisions, those people that are looking out
12
for my best interest are those that I have to look at the
13
very, very hardest.
14
While it very well may have been in all good faith
15
and honesty, a best decision to make, that still begs the
16
issue:

Muriel Mellen had the right to be told that she had

17
that money, and the fact that Sharon Mellen may have told
18
her at some later time, also begs the issue.
19
There was an agreement among those people at the
20
facility, that Muriel Mellen would not be told that she had
21
that money, and it's not the facility's right or the
22
decision of the facility to come to that conclusion.
23
So, once talking about the violation of public
24
policy, I must now go back to see whether or not the
25
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employer required the employee to violate that policy or
punished them for conducting—for conduct furthering it.
No, there was no evidence and there's no
implication at all that the—Fairview fired the plaintiff
due to the fact that they insisted that she continue to
violate the policy, that's not so, and she refused.

That's

not it.
But to punish the plaintiff for conduct furthering
it.

When I asked Mr.—when I asked—one of the questions

that the Court had was whether or not even though they—the
defendants complied with all of the changes, even though the
defendants, once brought to their attention that they were
lacking in paid—pay days or the Hepatitis B, they changed
it, still doesn't mean that someone could not be fired for
conduct furthering public policy.
If in fact she was fired for the phone call, if in
fact, she was fired for the looking out for resident's
rights, I agree with Mr. Petersen, that shouldn't be done.
That's exactly what happened here.

She was fired for

conduct in attempting to solidify and to—and to preserve
patient's and resident's rights. Muriel Mellen had the
right to know.

She wasn't given that right.

Ms. Rackley

did what she could to try to rectify the situation.
of that, she was discharged.

Accordingly, all three prongs

of Heslop has been met.
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Becausej

1
2

Now, we go to the issue of damages.

Once I've

indicated that, then obviously, counterclaim is not cause,
because this is a meritorious action and there's no relief

3
on defendant's counterclaim.
4
The damages, and—and you correctly indicated it,
5
Mr. Collins, that at 27,000 is what I have to begin with,
6
and it's 27,000 a year plus the two weeks, so I think you'll
7
have to make some fractional determination as to that; but
8
that will be the starting point.
9
While I may or may not have agreed with you
1b
regarding the unemployment, it is clear that there was n o —
11
no amount stated that I could even offset.

Even if I agreed

12
that unemployment should have been reduced from that 27,00013

14

plus, there was no amount that was shown.
And while Mr. Quintana very well may have asked

15
the defendant, how much did you receive, it never came in a
16
dollars and cents number, and so that's not before me and I
17
can't deduct it; however, for the job as hall monitor,
18
regardless of your position, Mr. Collins, I find that that
19
should be deducted, 5,700 or thereabouts, I don't know what
2b
the exact figure was, you find it out, that's going to be
21
22
23
24
25

deducted from the 2,700—27,000.
MR. COLLINS:

Whatever the evidence was

on that, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Pardon me?
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MR. COLLINS:

There was evidence on

that, whatever the evidence was is what I deduct?
THE COURT:

It was—it was—it was, I

believe it was her testimony—
MR. COLLINS:
THE COURT:

Yes, it was.

—how much she made.

MR. COLLINS: Yes.
THE COURT:

And that's the only thing

competent.
MR. COLLINS: Yes.
THE COURT:

There was no pay stubs that

was—I mean, it could have been $30,000 for whatever I know,
but there was no pay stubs that were subpoenaed, and the
only thing I have is her testimony, so that's—that's what
it will be.
Let's get into the area of general damages.

That-

-and that's a hard situation, because on one hand, Ms.
Rackley is wrong, she's persistent and she does make an
effort to get on—get on with her life, as evidenced by her
statements, regarding once she had received the notification
that her complaints had not drawn fruit, then she says,
okay, that's that and I'm getting on with things.
That, to me, indicates that the pain and suffering
that she did incur was not of a substantial nature and
furthermore, that while she did attempt to find employment
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in her chosen area, that of nursing home administration,
1
once another opportunity come along, presented itself, she
2
read—she chose that alternative route into law enforcement
3
rather than to pursue her—her main—her main desires in
4
nursing home administration.
5
I do not minimize the amount of pain and suffering]
6
that she may have incurred directly after the firing and
7
I've termed it a firing.

I do not find that it reaches any

8
proportion close to what has been suggested.

Accordingly,

9
minimal general damages of $3,500 will be awarded.

1b
With that, I also find that attorney's fees are
11
reasonably foreseeable in this matter pursuant to the
12
language of Heslop, 40 percent contingency, so what will be
13
done is, arithmetic; you take the 27,000-plus, minus the

14
5,700, add back the 3,500, take 40 percent of that, that's
15
going to be the attorney's fees and that will be the amount
16
of the judgment in this matter.
17
I further, in support of my findings, I further
18
turn to the—to the December 5th, 1994, report of Anna Lird,
19
Plaintiff's Exhibit 15, in which she had indicated:
2b
Conclusion, complaints semi-verified.

The resident had

21
signed a form where she gives authority to the facility to
&

open her mail.

The resident is alert and able to make

23

decisions about her financial affairs.

The resident consent|

24
that the family member handle her financial—the resident
25
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consent, and that should be consented, that the family
member handle her financial affairs.
And that was all done and there's nothing wrong
with that; however, and I agree with Ms. Lird on this, this
writing agreement should not be understood as if the
resident had declined to her rights of being informed about
her financial status.

I find that she did not decline that

right and that right was what was being pursued by Ms.
Rackley and that's what caused everything in this—in this
lawsuit.
Draft up the order on this, Mr. Collins and the
judgment.
It—it is unfortunate that—well, it's not
unfortunate.

The Court must rule on what is before me.

If

this case were tried ten different ways, I would have ten
different ways of how to rule on this case; but the status
of the evidence that is before me is, as I believe
accurately stated by myself.

I—I didn't have any other

choice but to rule this way, and accordingly, the Court will
enter judgment as indicated from the bench.
Mr. Collins, please be so kind to draft up the
appropriate pleadings and submit it.
MR. COLLINS:
Honor.

Thank you, your

Appreciate it.
THE COURT:

We're in recess.
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Yes.
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